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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20020154-CA 
vs. 
MATTHEW RUSHTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998), and for 
possession of vehicle parts without identification number, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated §41-1 a-1313 (1998). This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court violate defendant's due process rights when it permitted 
police officers to testify to telephone statements given them, during their 
investigation of the crime, by an individual who identified himself as defendant? 
Specifically, should the court have assessed the reliability of any voice 
identification in this case under the state constitutional standard for analyzing the 
reliability of eyewitness identification and should the court have concluded that any 
voice identification testimony was insufficiently reliable to present to the jury? 
Standard: "Due process challenges are questions of law that [this Court] 
review[s] applying a correction of error standard." West Valley City v. Roberts, 
1999 UT App. 358, f 6, 993 P.2d 252. 
2. Did the trial court err when it determined that defendant's telephone 
statements to the investigating officers met the authentication of evidence 
requirements of rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Standard: This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing 
a trial court determination that the evidence conformed with the requirements of the 
rule. See State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292,111,13 P.3d 604. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant rule is included in Addendum A: 
UtahR. Evid. 901. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with receiving a stolen vehicle, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998), and 
with possession of vehicle parts without identification number, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-la-1313 (1998). R. 2-3. 
Prior to trial defendant filed a "motion to suppress defendant's alleged 
statements." R. 28-29. Defendant argued that the State could not establish that he 
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was the person who telephoned the police during their investigation of the offense 
and made the statements. Id. Therefore, he argued, the evidence lacked 
foundation. Id. A hearing was held. R. 166. Defendant again argued that the 
State had provided an inadequate foundation for admission, claiming the State had 
failed to meet the authentication requirements of rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
R. 166:32-36, The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Id. at 36. 
Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty on both counts. 
R. 168:265, 266. Defendant was sentenced to a 240-day jail term and placed on 
probation for three years. R. 129, 147. Defendant timely appealed. R. 149. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Nathan Christensen parked his white jeep outside his apartment on March 30, 
1999. R. 167:25. A red trailer with his work tools was attached to the jeep. Id. at 
23. Sometime during the night the jeep and trailer disappeared. Id. at 25. 
The following day Officer Julie Jorgensen of the West Valley City Police 
Department saw and followed a vehicle matching the description of the stolen jeep. 
Id. at 170-171. When the vehicle entered a cul-de-sac, she waited for it to emerge. 
Id. at 171. When it did not, she entered the cul-de-sac and found that the driver had 
abandoned the vehicle and fled on foot. Id. at 172. The vehicle had license plates 
belonging to a yellow jeep owned by Julie and Clayton Arnold. Id. at 173. 
Officer Jorgensen sent a second officer to the Arnold home where he located 
the missing trailer. Id. at 174. Officer Jorgensen spoke to Julie Arnold, Clayton 
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Arnold's mother, who told Officer Jorgensen that defendant and her son had been 
working on the white jeep when she had returned home from work. Id. at 175-176. 
The officers tried unsuccessfully to locate defendant and Clayton Arnold that night. 
Id. at 176. 
Deputy Ben Blackmer of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department and 
Detective Holly Wright of the West Valley City Police Department investigated. 
Id. at 145, 190. They went together to the home of defendant's parents where each 
officer left a business card and asked defendant's parents to have defendant call 
when he returned. Id. at 149, 192. Each card listed the phone number for a direct 
line to the officer's desk, a number not available to the general public. Id. at 150, 
192. Calls not placed via the direct lines had to go through receptionists. R. 166:1-
11,20. 
The officers then went to the Arnold residence, where they interviewed 
Clayton Arnold. R. 167:150, 193-194. Arnold told them that defendant had 
brought the white jeep to his home. Arnold said that he had ridden in the white 
jeep, knowing it was stolen, but that he did not steel the jeep, remove its decals, 
alter its VIN, or change its license plates. See id. at 81-83, 92, 112-120, 151. The 
officers, still trying to reach defendant, also left business cards with Clayton Arnold 
and asked him to have defendant call them. Id. at 151, 208. 
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Deputy Blackmer then went to visit with Julie Arnold at her place of 
employment. Id. at 151. During this conversation, Ms. Arnold told him that 
defendant had a distinctive nervous giggle. Id. at 168. 
Sometime after 5:00 p.m. that day, Detective Wright received a telephone call 
on her direct line from an individual who identified himself as defendant. Id. at 
199. He indicated that he knew the police were looking for him "because of the 
Jeep," but that he was unwilling to come in because he knew that he would be 
jailed on an outstanding warrant. Id. The caller had an habitual nervous laugh. Id. 
at 200. The caller stated that he knew the jeep was stolen, but that he did not steal 
it. Id. at 201. He said that he "got it from a guy who wanted to get rid of it." Id. 
He also stated that "Clayton [Arnold] didn't have any part in it." Id. at 202. 
Detective Wright asked the caller to contact Deputy Blackmer, hoping that Deputy 
Blackmer "could talk him into coming in and talking about it." Id. The caller 
agreed to phone Deputy Blackmer. Id. 
Deputy Blackmer also received a call that afternoon from an individual who 
identified himself as defendant Id. at 1:53. The caller exhibited a nervous laugh 
that punctuated approximately every second or third sentence. Id. at 154. The 
caller refused to come in because he did not want to be arrested. Id. at 153. The 
caller admitted knowing the jeep was stolen, but denied having stolen it. Id. at 155. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The state constitutional standard for analyzing the reliability of eyewitness 
identification has no application to the facts of this case. The trial court properly 
admitted the inculpatory statements, made to police by a caller who identified 
himself as defendant, without conducting a Ramirez-type reliability analysis. First, 
police officers did not identify the caller. Second, nothing suggests that the 
reliability concerns associated with eyewitness testimony are relevant to voice 
identification testimony. Defendant has presented no scientific evidence, similar to 
that which undergirds the Ramirez standard for eyewitness identification reliability, 
for questioning the reliability of voice identification. Finally, the witnesses in this 
case were not crime victims identifying a perpetrator seen or heard during the 
commission of a crime. Rather, the witnesses were police officers reporting the 
information gathered during an investigation. 
The statements were properly subject to the authentication requirements of 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the statements where the caller identified himself as defendant, defendant 
was known to have a nervous laugh, the caller exhibited a nervous laugh, and the 
calls apparently came in response to police requests to have defendant call them. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE STATE CONSTTTUTIONAL STANDARD FOR ANALYZING THE 
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Defendant argues that the testimony of police officers regarding the telephone 
caller and his statements should have been subject to a reliability analysis akin to 
that mandated by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), for eyewitness 
identifications. Br. Aplt. at 16-25. That argument is not supported by the facts, 
holding, or policy considerations at stake in Ramirez. 
Ramirez involved the questionable identification of a suspect by a witness who 
had seen the masked perpetrator for only a moment and only at a considerable 
distance and who had identified the suspect only after police presented him 
handcuffed to a chain link fence at one o'clock in the morning, illuminated by 
police car headlights and spotlights, and attended by numerous police officers. 
When the identification testimony was challenged on appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court laid out the analysis fof assessing the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony. Referencing its own decision in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 488 (Utah 1986), which noted the virtually undisputed scientific research 
documenting the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, the Court held that a 
defendant is entitled to a determination of the constitutional reliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony before it is presented to the jury. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. 
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The court further indicated that the constitutional reliability of eyewitness 
identification testimony was to be determined "under the totality of the 
circumstances," after considering the following pertinent factors: 
(1) [t]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was 
the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed 
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was 
an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was 
observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the 
observer's. 
Mat781.1 
Unlike Ramirez, the instant case involves no identification. Further, even if 
the case presented a voice identification issue, no cases or studies suggest that the 
scientific basis for questioning the reliability of eyewitness identification has 
anything at all to do with voice identification. Further, the witnesses in this case 
were not crime victims identifying a perpetrator seen or heard during a crime, but 
police officers reporting information received during their investigation of a crime. 
Many, if not most, of the factors pertinent to victim-witness identifications are not 
relevant to police information-gathering. 
1
 Applying this analysis, the Supreme Court determined that the eyewitness 
testimony identifying Ramirez as the perpetrator was legally sufficient "to warrant a 
preliminary finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
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A. Defendant did not raise this claim below and has not argued "plain error91 
or "exceptional circumstances" on appeal; this Court should therefore 
decline to address the claim. 
Defendant did not claim below that the trial court should have applied a 
Ramirez-type analysis to voice identifications by investigating officers. Rather, he 
filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the State "[could not] lay an adequate 
foundation for the admission into evidence" of statements made by a telephone 
caller who identified himself as defendant. R. 28-29. In a hearing on the motion, 
defense counsel argued the application of Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
states that "[tjhe requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(a). 
Defendant did not argue that admission of the evidence violated his due process 
rights or that he was entitled to a "more searching reliability analysis." Br. Aplt. at 
2. Defendant therefore failed to preserve his claim that the trial court should have 
conducted a Ramirez-type analysis of the reliability of any voice identification. See 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539; 546 (Utah App. 1998) ("Trial counsel must state 
clearly and specifically all grounds for objection" and "[t]he objection must be 
specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error of which [defendant] 
complains") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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Further, defendant does not argue "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" 
on appeal. This court should therefore decline to consider this claim.2 See State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n. 5 (Utah 1995). 
B. The trial court did not err when it admitted statements allegedly made by 
defendant in calls to police officers without applying a Ramirez-type 
analysis. 
Even if defendant's claim were properly before this court, defendant could not 
prevail. A Ramirez-type analysis is not applicable to the facts of this case. 
1. A Ramirez-type analysis, applicable to eyewitness identifications, is not 
applicable in this case because no identification occurred. 
Eyewitness identification is the identification of an individual based on having 
seen that person in another context. Most frequently in criminal cases, it involves 
identifying a person in a courtroom, in a lineup or showup, or in a photo spread 
based on having seen that person during the commission of a crime. See State v. 
Hollen, 2002 UT 35, 44 P.3d 794 (photo array, lineup, trial); State v. Maestas, 1999 
UT 32, 984 P.2d 376 (showup, lineup, trial); Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 774; Long, 721 
P.2d at 483. Voice identification is "[identification of a voice . . . by opinion 
2Further, defendant could not have prevailed on a "plain error" argument. "[A] 
trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997). Defendant cites only one 
Utah case addressing the constitutional reliability of voice identifications, State v. Silva, 
2000 UT App 292, f 18, 13 P.3d 604, where this Court held that identification of a 
recorded voice does not require the same reliability analysis as eyewitness identification 
testimony. See id, at f 19 n.2. Silva presents no obvious precedent for defendant's 
argument; in fact, defendant attempts to distinguish Silva in making his argument. 
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based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with 
the alleged speaker." See Rule 901(5), Utah R. Evid.. 
Defendant apparently claims that officers Wright and Blackmer identified him 
as the caller who told them he knew the jeep was stolen. R. 167:155, 200-201. 
Defendant misconstrues the facts. No voice identification occurred. 
Both officers testified that they left their business cards with defendant's 
friends and/or relatives and asked them to have defendant call. Id. at 149, 151, 192, 
197, 208. Both testified that later that day they received calls from a party who 
identified himself as defendant. Id. at 153, 199. Both stated that they did not know 
defendant and had not had any other conversation with him. Id. at 155-156, 209. 
While both believed that defendant was the caller, neither identified defendant as 
the caller. See id. at 153-156, 198-203. Rather, they testified to the content of the 
telephone conversation and to the reasons they believed that defendant was the 
caller. See id. The witnesses did not hear a voice and identify it as defendant's 
voice based upon hearing his voice at any other time. No voice identification 
occurred. Therefore, the analysis for determining the constitutional reliability of 
eyewitness identifications, even assuming its relevance to voice identifications, is 
not applicable in this case. 
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2. Defendant has presented no scientific basis for extending the state 
constitutional standards governing the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony to the admissibility of voice identification 
testimony. 
The Supreme Court clearly mandated the Ramirez analytical model in response 
to a body of scientific research expressly applicable to eyewitness identifications. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-780. The Court cited to State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986), where it had referenced the voluminous scientific research 
documenting the questionable reliability of some eyewitness testimony, including 
studies demonstrating "the fallibility of eyewitness testimony," the lack of juror 
appreciation for this fallibility, and the great weight that jurors give to eyewitness 
testimony.3 See id. at 488-492. 
Defendant apparently asserts that voice recognition testimony is sufficiently 
analogous to eyewitness identification to mandate the same constitutional test for 
reliability. In urging this expansion, however, defendant fails to cite any cases or 
studies documenting that the scientific basis for questioning the reliability of 
eyewitness identification has anything at all to do with voice recognition, much less 
that the two are so closely allied as to require identical scrutiny. Absent such 
studies, no basis exists for extending the state constitutional standards governing the 
}Long involved the refusal of a trial court to give a cautionary instruction 
concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification. In Long, "[t]he State's case hinged 
on the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of a single witness—the victim of the crime" 
and "[t]he circumstances surrounding his identification raised grave concerns about its 
reliability." 721 P.2dat 487. 
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admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony to the admissibility of voice 
identification testimony. 
This Court has previous addressed the fundamental difference between 
eyewitness identification evidence and voice identification evidence. In State v. 
Silva, this Court rejected a defendant's argument that the constitutional test for 
eyewitness identification reliability should apply to the identification of a recorded 
voice. 2000 UT App 292, 13 P.3d 604. Observing that "virtually all testimony 
involves perception and memory," the court noted two reasons that "[d]ue process 
requires that courts scrutinize the admissibility of eyewitness testimony more 
stringently than the admission of other testimony." Id. at f 19 n.2. "[F]irst, 
scientific literature is replete with empirical studies documenting the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification, and second, jurors do not appreciate the fallibility of 
eyewitness testimony [and] they give such testimony great weight" Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). This Court determined that those factors 
did not exist with respect to the voice identification evidence at issue. 
Likewise, those factors do not exist with respect to any voice identification 
testimony presented here. 
3. Any voice identification testimony in this case does not involve the 
reliability concerns inherent in eyewitness identification and does not 
require the same constitutional test for reliability. 
Even if the issue were preserved and even if the police officers had identified 
defendant's voice, this case would not involve the reliability concerns inherent in 
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eyewitness identification and would not require a Ramirez-Vfpt reliability analysis. 
The typical eyewitness identification requiring a Ramirez analysis involves a crime 
victim identifying a stranger. Scientific evidence has demonstrated that the stress 
and fear attendant to such a situation can negatively affect the witness's ability to 
perceive and remember. See Long, 721 P.2d at 489. The witness's opportunity to 
view is often limited by the hurry associated with much criminal activity, by lack of 
lighting, and by the perpetrator's use of disguises. See id. at 488-489. The criminal 
act usually comes as a surprise to the witness and requires the witness to identify 
the perpetrator with little preparation time. Further, identification often involves the 
use of lineups, showups, and photo spreads, which can permit the use ot suggestion 
to influence the witness-identifier. See id. at 490. 
Here, the witnesses testifying were not crime victims reporting what they saw 
during the commission of a crime. Rather, they were police officers testifying 
about what they learned while investigating a crime. Defendant has pointed to no 
precedent requiring a Ramirez-type reliability analysis of police officer 
identification of persons with whom they interact while conducting an investigation. 
Nor would that analysis seem reasonable even in the context of eyewitness 
identifications. For instance, Utah precedent does not suggest that a police officer's 
in-court identification of a defendant as the person who confessed to a crime should 
be subject to a Ramirez reliability analysis. Neither should an officer's 
identification of a defendant as the person who gave certain telephone statements 
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during an investigation be subject to that analysis. The reliability concerns 
associated with a victim-witness's identification are not ordinarily present when an 
investigator identifies his sources.4 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT'S 
TELEPHONE STATEMENTS TO INVESTIGATING OFFICERS MET 
THE AUTHENTICATION OF EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 
901, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant next argues that the telephone call alleged to come from defendant 
to the investigating officers was not properly authenticated. Br. ^plt. at 25-30. 
Defendant argues that the caller's self-identification and his exhibition of a nervous 
laugh were insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 901, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Defendant's argument fails. The self-identification and the nervous 
laugh, together with the context in which the calls were made, provided sufficient 
evidence to meet the requirements of the rule. 
Authentication is, in essence, a relevancy issue. The relevancy of a writing, 
some other piece of evidence, or a telephone conversation is "logically dependent 
upon the existence of some connection between that [evidence] and a particular 
individual." 2 John William Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 218 (4th ed. 1992). 
4Defendant refers to dicta in Silva suggesting that "a situation may arise when a 
person witnesses a crime but only hears the perpetrator's voice. If this witness later 
identifies someone based solely upon his or her recollection of the perpetrator's voice, 
that defendant may be entitled to a reliability analysis akin to that used for eyewitness 
testimony." 2000 UT App 292, f 18 n.l. This statement is only dicta and, in any case, 
details a situation distinguishable from the instant case. 
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"The real question, however, is not whether such a connection is logically necessary 
for relevancy, but rather what standards are to be applied in determining whether 
the connection has been made to appear." Id. 
The standards are minimal. See 3 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules 
of Evidence Manual 1988 (7th ed. 1998) ('The requirements for authenticating 
evidence are not burdensome"). The proponent of the evidence need only make a 
prima facie showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. Utah R. 
Evid. 901(a); see also 5 Joseph M. McLaughlin et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence 
§ 901.02[3J (2d. ed. 2002). In other words, the proponent must introduce sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable juror's conclusion that the evidence is what it 
purports to be. Id. at n.23 & cases cited therein. The proponent need not prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be, and he need not 
rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity. See United States v. 
Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 1994). Once the proponent has met this 
standard, the trial court should admit the evidence. Inconsistencies or flaws in the 
authentication "go to the weight of the evidence instead of its admissibility/' and 
become issues for jury determination. See McLaughlin, § 901.02[3] n.25 and cases 
cited therein. 
In sum, rule 901 "does not require absolute certainty or conclusive proof." 
State v. Mays, 729 A.2d 1074, 1079 (N.J. Super. 1999). If a prima facie showing is 
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made, the evidence comes in "and the ultimate question of authenticity is left to the 
jury." 2 John William Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 227 (4th ed. 1992). 
Rule 901 applies to telephone conversations. Like writings, they must be 
authenticated. Rule 901 presents ten examples of acceptable means for proving the 
authenticity or identification. The ten examples are "[b]y way of illustration only, 
and not be way of limitation." Utah R. Evid. 901(b). Direct evidence of the 
identity of a caller through recognition of the caller's voice, one of the ten 
examples, is one method of authentication. See Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(5). 
Circumstantial evidence of the identity of the caller, however, may also suffice. See 
Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(4); see also McLaughlin at § 901.03[8] ("proof of authenticity 
may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence; no direct evidence is required"). 
One method of authenticating evidence, frequently used with documents but 
also applicable to telephone conversations, is the reply technique (also called the 
"reply doctrine"). "A telephone call can be authenticated with or without the 
identification of the speakers or the source of the call if it is in reply to a previous 
communication. . . . The previous communication can be a letter, telephone call, or 
any other transmission that can be authenticated." 5 Jack B. Weinstein and 
Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence \ 901(b)(6)[02] (1994); see also Mays, 
729 A.2d at 1079 ("even though the recipient of a telephone call cannot identify the 
voice of the caller, he may still authenticate the telephone call by establishing that it 
was received in response to his request"); State v. Lynes, 401 N.E.2d 405, 407 
17 
(N.Y. 1980) (call properly authenticated where received by detective from 
defendant shortly after he had left word for defendant to call him). 
In this case, the evidence, including evidence that the challenged telephone 
statements came in reply to previous police communications, supports the trial 
court's authentication ruling. First, the caller identified himself as defendant. 
While self-identification alone is usually insufficient to meet the requirements of 
rule 901, it is a factor to be considered. Next, the caller exhibited a nervous laugh. 
While the exhibition of a nervous laugh alone may be insufficient to meet the 
requirements of the rule, it too is a factor to be considered—a distinctive 
characteristic. See Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(4). But these factors, together with the 
circumstances under which the phone call was received—by the two officers on 
their direct lines shortly after they left messages for defendant to call them, suffice. 
They are "sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question [the phone 
statements] are what [the] proponent claims [statements from defendant]." Utah R. 
Evid. 901(a).5 
5
 While not referring the "reply doctrine," the trial judge clearly considered its 
application to the authentication issue. Explaining his reasons for denying the motion to 
suppress the telephone statements, he said: 
I'm going to deny the motion on a couple of grounds. There—the 
distinctive laugh or the nervous laugh is hardly enough in and of itself to 
identify the caller as [defendant], but I guess what's more persuasive to me 
is that the officers left their telephone number, their direct numbers with 
Mr. Clayton Arnold and directed him to ask [defendant] to get in touch 
with them and later on, apparently that same day, someone representing 
himself to be [defendant] did. That would be sufficient, at least, to meet the 
18 
Defendant argues that Clayton Arnold may have called the detectives and 
identified himself as defendant. Defendant argues that Arnold had both the 
opportunity (because he had been given the numbers to the officers' direct lines) 
and motive (because he wanted to shift blame from himself). Br. Aplt. at 24-25, 
29. The State, however, was not required to rule out all other possible sources for 
the telephone statements. Once it had established a basis upon which a reasonable 
juror could have found that the phone calls came from defendant, evidence 
suggesting other possible sources for the calls was a matter for jury consideration. 
The possibility that someone else could have made the call was relevant to the 
weight to be given the evidence, not to its admissibility. 
In sum, rule 901 required the State to provide evidence from which a 
reasonable juror could find that the telephone statements in this case were made by 
defendant. The rule does not require that the evidence be conclusive. The State 
introduced evidence showing that the caller identified himself as defendant, that the 
caller had a nervous laugh, and that defendant had a nervous laugh. Further, the 
State showed that the calls were received on the investigators * direct and non-public 
phone lines shortly after they left their numbers with defendant's family and 
threshold to let the trier of fact then decide whether or not the caller was 
[defendant] or whether someone else called and used his name. 
R. 166:36 (emphasis added). 
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friends, asking that he contact them. This evidence sufficed to authenticate the 
statements. 
Finally, even had the judge erred in admitting the telephone statements, the 
error would be harmless. The State presented uncontroverted evidence from Julie 
Arnold and Clayton Arnold that defendant brought the white jeep to their home and 
began removing decals from it. R. 167:44-46, 80. He told one of them that his 
father had purchased it for him and the other that he was buying it himself. Id. at 
46, 93. In light of this evidence, there is no "reasonable likelihood" that admission 
of the telephone statements affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). If error occurred, it was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on September jfj_, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
( JHjUSNE B. INOUYE 
\ . Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification. 
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of 
authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based 
upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with 
specimens which have been authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other 
distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or 
electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under 
circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a call was made to the number 
assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a 
person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or 
(B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and the conversation related to 
business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in 
fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data 
compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or data compilation, in any form, 
(A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, 
if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or more at the time it is offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing 
that the process or system produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by 
court rule or statute of this state. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subdivision (b)(2) is in accord with State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447 (1906). Subdivision 
(b)(8) is comparable with Rule 67, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), except that the former rule imposed a 
30-year requirement. Subdivision (b)(10) is an adaptation of subdivision (10) in the comparable federal 
rules to conform to state practice. 
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(Cite as: 1998 WL 1758314 (Utah App.)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
MURRAY CITY, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Roderick CULLEY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No- 971672-CA-
Nov. 27,1998. 
D Gilbert Athav and Ml^Ml R SftQttt Salt Lake 
City, for appellant 
G.L. Cntchficld, Murray, for appellee. 
Before BENCH, GARFFJEMU and GREENWi 
JJ. 
FN1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, 78-2-*2V19951: Utah Code Jud Admin. 
R3- 108(4). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
GREENWOOD. 
*1 Defendant Roderick Culley appeals his conviction 
of violating a protective order in violation ofUtahCode 
Ann 76-5-108H1 (SimoJ9981 on the grounds of 
insufficiency of the evidence. We affirm. 
When a defendant challenges a conviction based upon 
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the " 'evidence 
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to die verdict' " We 
reverse only when the evidence " 'is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was 
convicted' M State v Johnson. 821 P2d 1150. 1156 
(Utah 1992^ (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
Page I 
Utah Code Ann, section 76*5-108(1) provides that 
"[a]ny defendant subject to a protective order 
who intentionally violates that order after having been 
properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor " 
Utah Code Ann. 76-5-108*11 (SUDD 1998) (emphasis 
added). Defendant argues that service is an element that 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
convict him of this offense and that because he was not 
properly served, the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him. We disagree. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-1 -50 \(2)( 1995) defines "element 
of the offense'* as "(a) [t]he conduct attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, 
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
[and] (b) the culpable mental state required." Applying 
basic rules of statutory construction, service is not an 
element of the crime when sections 76-5- lQgfll and 
76-MO If 21 are "construed in a harmonious 
fashion."S/ar« v. Sotaa. 846 P2d 1313. 131TfUtah 
CtApp. 19931 (citation omitted). Also, because it is 
unclear whether section 76-5-10X11 requires service 
for conviction of the crime, we must look to other 
sections of the Criminal Code to interpret the meaning 
of that section. See Clover v Snowbird Sh Resort. 808 
P.2d 1037. 1045 OJtah 19911 (citation omitted) 
(holding '* '[i]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the 
meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is 
appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of 
its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in 
accordance with its intent and purpose'"). Therefore, 
although section 76-5-108(11 mentions proper service, 
this section, when read in conjunction with the specific 
definition of the elements of an offense unaer section 
76-1-501(21. does not include service as an element of 
the crane. See State v. Bishop. 753 P 2d 439.468 (Utah 
19881 (holding court's '"primary responsibility'' is to 
"give effect to the legislature's intent, even if our 
interpretation appears at odds with conventional usage 
or literal construction of the statutory language ') 
Moreover, we believe service of process is relevant 
only to the culpable mental state required, as well as to 
basic principles of due process and fairness Section 
76-5-108(11 requires the State to prove a defendant 
'intentionally'* violated a protective order. Proper 
service of a protective order probably establishes the 
requisite mens rea of intentionality, but it is not the only 
means of doing so, as demonstrated in this case 
*2 Even assuming arguendo that service is required 
under the statute, defendant effectively waived this 
requirement. Waiver is defined as "the relinquishment 
of some claim, right, privilege, or of the opportunity 
Copr © West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt. Works 
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to take advantage of some defect, irregularity, or 
wrong." Black's Law Dictionary 1092 (6th ed. 1991). 
Here, defendant's presence at the hearing on the 
protective order, stipulation to entry of the order, and 
admission at trial that he was aware of the terms of the 
protective order, together constitute an "implied 
relinquishment of [his] legal right" to service of 
process. See id 
The purpose of the service requirement in section 
76-5-108(n is to provide notice to a defendant subject 
to a protective order of the prohibited conduct. 
However, where, as here, defendant received notice of 
the contents of the protective order by his presence at 
the hearing or through other channels, service is 
unnecessary. fFN2| A similar conclusion was reached 
in Small v. State, in which the Texas Court of Appeals 
held that service is not the only manner in which a 
defendant may obtain notice of a protective order 
against him. See id. 809 S.W.2d 253. 256-57 
(Tcx.CtApp.l991Y Rather, the State may establish that 
a defendant was aware of a protective order in many 
ways, one of which is that the defendant "agreed to a 
protective order, attended any hearing or in any way 
participated" such that he received notice, formal or 
informal, of the order. Id (emphasis added). Similarly, 
in Ramos v. State, that same court upheld the conviction 
of a defendant for violating a protective order because 
the evidence established that "appellant had knowledge 
of the existence of the court order or was at least aware 
of it before he committed the offensive act," despite the 
fact that defendant was "never served with or given the 
opportunity to read the protective order." 923 S.W.2d 
m ttE-M 2M. 2*7 011,ftAPP,l?K) (holding 
defendant not deprived of due process rights if present 
at hearing, represented by counsel, and given fair 
opportunity to object to issuance of order). These cases 
support the State's contention dial as long as a 
defendant who is subject to a protective order receives 
notice, either formally or informally, of the prohibited 
conduct, he may be convicted of violating that order. 
Thus, because defendant in this case received notice of 
the protective order through his presence and 
participation at the hearing, he effectively waived his 
right to service. 
a permanent protective order when defendant 
was served with the ex parte order and had 
notice of the hearing on the permanent 
protective order but had not been served with 
it. See id 
FN3. Texas Penal Code Ann. 25.07^2^ 
(Vernon Supp.1998) provides that a person 
violates a protective order if he knowingly or 
intentionally "communicates directly with a... 
member of the family or household in a 
threatening or harassing manner.../' Although 
this statute does not require that defendant be 
properly served with the protective order, 
Texas courts have held that for a defendant to 
be guilty of violating a protective order, he 
must be given notice of die protective order. 
See Hqmh 92? §.W.24 at 19? 
CONCLUSION 
Because there was sufficient evidence presented at trial 
to support defendant's conviction, we reject defendant's 
challenge of insufficient evidence and affirm 
defendant's conviction of violation of a protective 
order. 
GARFF, Judge, concur. 
BENCH. Judge, concur in the result 
1998 WL 1758314 (Utah App.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
FN2. In State v. Rudolph the Utah Supreme 
Court held "that an actor must have been 
'properly served* with the protective order 
before he or she can be convicted of violating 
Utah Code Ann 76-5-108." 349 Utah 
Adv.Reo. 11. 17 (Utah 1998V However, the 
court found that it was proper to charge 
defendant with violating an ex parte order or 
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Addendum B 
AHHpnHnm R 
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another - Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order or ex parte protective 
order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court 
Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as 
described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having been 
properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 
77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence offense under Section 
77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
Amended by Chapter 246, 1999 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 76_05018.ZIP 2,285 Bytes 
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JOANNA B. SAGERS, #5632 
ROBIN L. RAVERT, #7964 ,. 
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE MA f 2 0 " 7 7 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
t 
TELEPHONE: (801) 328-8849 
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 200 ~X4*__ 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 -«*V.y v**, -
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOLYNNE THOMAS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LAVAR T. JENSEN, 
Respondent. 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. Q l ^H e \ 0 2 ^ 3 7 C A 
Judge F>*Afc- G. $0*\-
This matter came for hearing on f \ . C * ? D<\ijT9r . before the undersigned. The 
following parties were in attendance: _ _ 
^ar Petitioner s ^ Petitioner's attorney 
£ f Respondent a Respondent's attorney 
The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
having received argument and evidence, 
^ having accepted the stipulation of the parties 
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear 
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
each section that is included in this Order.) 
_ d . 1- The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
8.16 96 
2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of 
Petitioner's family or household: 
3. The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, 
telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
4. The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from 
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at: 4924 South Holladav Blvd.. 
Hnltodflv Utah m 17 and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with 
the utility services to the residence. 
5. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment, 
and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and 
the designated household and family members. These places are identified by the 
following addresses: Novm Services. 8473 South Sandy Parkway. Sandv. Utah: 272 
East MM Smith. Sandv. Utah (Petitioner's soul: 4M1 nfrie Ann Drive. West Valley 
City, Utah 84121 fPttitioner's sister); and, (W35 South Vista Grande Drive. 
HoUaday, Utah (PttitiOMrt sister). 
6. The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose 
a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, 
or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s): 
7. The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or 
other essential personal effects: 
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic 
proceedings. 
8. An officer from the following law enforcement agency: Salt Lake County Sheriff 
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner safely regains possession of the 
awarded property. 
9. An officer from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's 
removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The 
law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent 
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items. 
10. The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this Order, 
the Department of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on Respondent 
and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in the residence 
of Respondent. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of Corrections the costs 
2 
of the electronic monitoring required by this Order. The Department of Corrections shall 
have access to Petitioner's residence to install the appropriate monitoring equipment. 
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" THROUGH "10" MAY BE A CLASS 
A MISDEMEANOR. 
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "1") which will 
(expire/be reviewed by the court) 150 days from the date of this order 
a. The Petitioner is granted custody of the following minor children: 
b. Visitation shall be as follows: 
c. The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during 
visitation. 
d. The Respondent is restrained from removing die parties' minor child/ren from the 
state of Utah. 
e. The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of 
S pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
f. The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
g. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care 
expenses. 
h. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical 
expenses including premiums, deductibles and co-payments. 
I. The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of 
$. 
j . The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a result 
of die abuse in the amount of $ . 
k. The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren's medical expenses, suffered 
as a result of me abuse in the amount of $ 
I. Other: ______________ 
3 i> 16/94 
Violation of provisions "a" through "1" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings. 
11. The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation 
into the allegation of child abuse. 
12. Other: 
^ 
s£* ? \ 13. Law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have 
Authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly 
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification 
of the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order. 
14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
tve rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of 
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories. 
15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the 
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the 
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made 
available to Respondent. 
DATED: XM 7 
BY THE COURT: 
c::.Tn?Y THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY 
0' AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON 
IN THE TjrffflO DISTRICT COURT 
LAKE COUNffY STATE Off U t 
i— Mi)// _ 
(DEPUTY COURT C 
4 s , ;y* 
Recommended by: 
District ^ oi^Commissioner Date 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service, 
of this Protective Order and waives the right to be personally served. 
Serve Respondent at: 
5 8/16/96 
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American Bar Association 
Return to: http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html 
'^^
:
^:J3shn on Domestic Vichnce 
PREVALENCE 
Domestic violence crosses ethnic, racial, age, national origin, 
sexual orientation, religious and socioeconomic lines. 
• by the most conservative estimate, each year 1 million women suffer nonfatal 
violence by an intimate. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348), August 1995, p. 3. 
• by other estimates, 4 million American women experience a serious assault by an 
intimate partner during an average 12-month period. 
Amencan Psychl. Ass'n, Violence and the Family: Report of the American Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p. 10. 
• nearly 1 in 3 adult women experience at least one physical assault by a partner 
during adulthood. 
Amencan Psychl. Ass'n, Violence and the Family: Report of the American Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p. 10. 
• 28% of all annual violence against women is perpetrated by intimates. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: National Crime Victimization Survey, Violence Against Women 
(NCJ-145325). January 1994. 
• 5% of all annual violence against men is perpetrated by intimates. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report National Crime Victimization Survey, Violence Against Women 
(NCJ-145325), January 1994. 
• during 1994, 21 % of all violent victimizations against women were committed by an 
intimate, but only 4% of violent victimizations against men were committed by an 
intimate. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Sex Differences in Violent Victimization, 1994 (NCJ-164508), 
September, 1997, pp. 1-3. 
• in 1993, approximately 575,000 men were arrested for committing violence against 
women, approximately 49,000 women were arrested for committing violence against 
men. 
Amencan Psychl. Ass'n, Violence and the Family: Report of the Amencan Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p 10 
RACE 
Race is not indicative of who is at risk of domestic violence. 
• domestic violence is statistically consistent across racial and ethnic boundaries. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Violence Against Women. Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348). August 1995, p 3 
http://www.abanet.org/scrip^ 11'20/^002 
A\network 
AGE 
Batterers and victims may experience domestic violence at any 
age. 
• women ages 19-29 reported more violence by intimates than any other age group 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Violence Against Women Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348) August 1995 p 4 
• women aged 46 or older are least likely to be battered by an intimate 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Violence Against Women Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348), August 1995 p 4 
• in a 1990 restraining order study, the age of abusers ranged from 17 - 70. two-thirds 
of the abusers were between the ages 24 and 40. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? (1996), p 195 
GENDER 
An overwhelming majority of domestic violence victims in 
heterosexual relationships are women. 
• 90 - 95% of domestic violence victims are women. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected Findings Violence Between Intimates (NCJ-149259), November 1994 
• as many as 95% of domestic violence perpetrators are male. 
A Report of the Violence against Women Research Strategic Planning Workshop sponsored by the National 
Institute of Justice in cooperation with the U S Department of Health and Human Services, 1995 
• much of female violence is committed in self-defense, and inflicts less injury than 
male violence 
Chalk & King, eds Violence in Families Assessing Prevention & Treatment Programs, National Resource 
Council and Institute of Medicine, p 42 (1998) 
• during 1992-1993, women were 6 times more likely to experience violence by an 
intimate partner than men. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Violence Against Women Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348), August 1995, p 1 
• the chance of being victimized by an intimate is 10 times greater for a woman than a 
man 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report National Crime victimization Survey, Violence Against Women, 
1994 
• 70% of intimate homicide victims are female 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected Findings Violence Between Intimates (NCJ-149259), November 1994 
e male perpetrators are 4 times more likely to use lethal violence than females 
Flonda Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence Flonda Mortality Review Project, 1997 p 44 
table 7 
SAME-SEX BATTERING 
Domestic violence occurs within same-sex relationships with the 
same statistical frequency as in heterosexual relationships. 
• the prevalence of domestic violence among Gay and Lesbian couples is 
Uttn i « n n u aKanot n r o / c r n n t e / n n n t v i c u ; isn^Rpfsihttn / / w w w ahanet Offf/domVlol/statS h t m l 1 1 20 2 0 0 2 
approximately 25 - 33% 
Barnes Its Just a Quarrel* American Bar Association Journal, February 1998 p 25 
• battering among Lesbians crosses age, race, class, lifestyle and socio-economic 
lines 
Lobel ed Naming the Violence Speaking Out About Lesbian Battenng 183 (1986) 
• each year, between 50,000 and 100,000 Lesbian women and as many as 500,000 
Gay men are battered 
Murphy Queer Justice Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 Val U L Rev 335 
(1995) 
• while same-sex battenng mirrors heterosexual battenng both in type and prevalence, 
its victims receive fewer protections 
Bames, It's Just a Quarrel' Amencan Bar Association Journal, February 1998. p 24 
• seven states define domestic violence in a way that excludes same-sex victims; 21 
states have sodomy laws that may require same-sex victims to confess to a cnme in 
order to prove they are in a domestic relationship. 
Barnes, It's Just a Quarrel', American Bar Association Journal, February 1998. p 24 
• many battered Gays or Lesbians fight back to defend themselves - it is a myth that 
same-sex battenng is mutual. 
Murphy, Queer Justice Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 Val U L Rev 335 
(1995) 
• by 1994, there were over 1,500 shelters and safe houses for battered women many 
of these shelters routinely deny their services to victims of same-sex battenng. 
Murphy Queer Justice Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence. 30 Val U L Rev 335 
(1995) 
• same-sex batterers use forms of abuse similar to those of heterosexual batterers, 
they have an additional weapon in the threat of "outing" their partner to family, 
friends, employers or community. 
Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in 
Massachusetts. 28 New Eng L Rev 273 (Winter 1993) 
BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN 
Battered immigrant women face unique legal, social and economic 
problems. 
• domestic violence is thought to be more prevalent among immigrant women than 
among U S. citizens. 
Anderson. A License to Abuse. The Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants. 102 Yale L J 1401 
(Apnl 1993) 
• immigrant women may suffer higher rates of battering than U S citizens because 
they come from cultures which accept domestic violence, or because they have less 
access to legal and social services than U S citizens in addition, immigrant 
batterers and victims may believe that the penalties and protections of the U S legal 
system do not apply to them. 
Orioff et al With No Place to Turn Improving Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, Family Law Quarterly, 
vol 29 no 2 313 (Summer 1995) 
• a battered woman who is not a legal resident, or whose immigration status depends 
on her partner, is isolated by cultural dynamics which may prevent her from leaving 
her husband or seeking assistance from the legal system these factors contribute to 
the higher incidence of abuse among immigrant women 
Ortoff et al With No Place to Turn Improving Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, Family Law Quarterly 
vol 29 no 2 313 (Summer 1995) 
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• some obstacles faced by battered immigrant women include a distrust of the legal 
system arising from their experiences with the system in their native countries, 
cultural and language barriers, and fear of deportation 
Ortoff et al With No Place to Turn Improving Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women Family Law Quarterly 
vol 29 no 2, 313 (Summer 1995) 
• a battered immigrant woman may not understand that she can personally tell her 
story in court, or that a judge will believe her based on her experience in her native 
country, she may believe that only those who are wealthy or have ties to the 
government will prevail in court batterers often manipulate these beliefs by 
convincing the victim he will prevail in court because he is a male, a citizen or that 
he has more money 
Ortoff et al With No Place to Turn Improving Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women Family Law Quarterly, 
vol 29 no 2 313 (Summer 1995) 
• although a victim may be in the country legally by virtue of her marnage to the 
batterer, their status may be conditional; in this situation it is common for a batterer 
to exert his control over his wife's immigration status in order to force her to remain 
in the relationship 
Jang, Caught in a Web Immigrant Women and Domestic Violence, National Cleannghouse (Special Issue 
1994), p 400 
• undocumented women may be reported to Immigration and Naturalization Services 
by law enforcement or social services personnel from whom they may seek 
assistance 
Jang, Caught in a Web immigrant Women and Domestic Violence, National Cleannghouse (Special Issue 
1994). p 397-399 
• a battered immigrant woman is often trapped in an abusive relationship by 
economics she may have legal or practical impediments to obtaining employment or 
public assistance 
Jang, Caught in a Web Immigrant Women and Domestic Violence, National Clearinghouse (Special Issue 
1994) p 403 
• batterered immigrant women who attempt to flee may have no access to bilingual 
shelters, financial assistance or food it is unlikely that she will have the assistance 
of a certified interpreter in court, when reporting complaints to police or a 911 
operator, or even in acquiring information about her rights and the legal system. 
Ortoff et al With No Place to Turn Improving Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, Family Law Quarterly, 
vol 29 no 2 313 (Summer 1995) 
WELFARE RECIPIENTS 
Domestic violence may affect a woman's ability to financially 
support herself and her children. 
e past and current victims of domestic violence are over-represented m the welfare 
population, the majority of welfare recipients have experienced domestic abuse in 
their adult lives, and a high percentage are currently abused 
Raphael & Tolman, Trapped by Poverty, Trapped by Abuse New Evidence Documenting tne Relationship 
Between Domestic Violence and Welfare , p 20 (1997) 
e abused (past or current) welfare recipients expenence higher levels of health or 
mental health problems such as a physical disability, or serious or acute depression 
Raphael & Tolman Trapped by Poverty Trapped by Abuse New Evidence Documenting the Relationship 
Between Domestic Violence and Welfare p 21 (1997) 
• 15 - 50% of abused women report interference from their partner with education 
training or work 
Raphael & Tolman Trapped by Poverty Trapped by Abuse New Evidence Documenting the Relationship 
8etween Domestic Violence and Welfare p 22(1997) 
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• welfare studies show that abused women do seek employment, but are unable to 
maintain it it is possible that domestic violence presents a barrier to sustained labor 
market participation 
Raphael & Tolman Trapped by Poverty Trapped by Abuse New Evidence Documenting the Relationship 
Between Domestic Violence and Welfare p 22 (1997) 
• examples of abusers' sabotage of their victims' attempts to work include calling her 
employer and ordering the victim to quit, making allegations requiring the victim to 
appear before the police, court or social services, threatening to kill the victim, 
committing suicide in front of the victim, sabotaging the victim's car, beating her up 
on the way to an interview, stealing her work uniforms, starting fights each day 
before school or work, breaking the victim's wnting arm repeatedly, manipulating her 
schedule by demanding visitation with the children, stalking, starting fights or 
threatening abuse which affects her ability to concentrate at work, or encouraging 
continued drug addition 
Raphael & Tolman Trapped by Poverty Trapped by Abuse New Evidence Documenting the Relationship 
Between Domestic Violence and Welfare pp 10-14 (1997) 
• between one- and two-thirds of welfare recipients reported having suffered domestic 
violence at some point in their adult lives, between 15 - 32% reported current 
domestic victimization. 
Raphael & Tolman, Trapped by Poverty Trapped by Abuse New Evidence Documenting the Relationship 
Between Domestic Violence and Welfare p 21 (1997) 
RECIDIVISM 
Battering tends to be a pattern of violence rather than a one-time 
occurrence. 
• during the six months following an episode of domestic violence, 32% of battered 
women are victimized again 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Preventing Domestic Violence Against Women, 1986 
• 47% of men who beat their wives do so at least 3 times per year 
AMA Diagnostic & Treatment Guidelines on Domestic Violence, SEC 94-677 3M 9/94 (1994) 
• short term (6-12 week) psycho-educational batterer-intervention programs helped 
some batterers stop immediate physical violence but were inadequate in stopping 
abuse over time some batterers became more sophisticated in their psychological 
abuse and intimidation after attending such programs 
American Psycni Ass'n Violence and the Family Report of the American Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p 85 
• six months after obtaining a protection order* 8% of victims reported post-order 
physical abuse; 26% reported respondent came to or called their home or 
workplace, 65% reported no further problems 
CPOs the Benefits and Limitations for Victims of Domestic Violence National Center for State Courts Research 
Report, 1997 
CHILDREN 
Domestic violence has immediate and long term detrimental effects 
on children. 
• each year, an estimated 3 3 million children are exposed to violence by family 
members against their mothers or female caretakers 
American Psychl Ass n Violence and the Family Report of the Amencan Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996) p 11 
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• in homes where partner abuse occurs, children are 1,500 times more likely to be 
abused. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Family Violence Interventions for the Justice System, 
1993 
• 40-60% of men who abuse women also abuse children. 
Amencan Psych! Ass'n, Violence and the Family Report of the Amencan Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p 80 
• fathers who batter mothers are 2 times more likely to seek sole physical custody of 
their children than are non-violent fathers. 
Amencan Psychi Ass'n, Violence and the Family Report of the Amencan Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p. 40. 
• in one study, 27% of domestic homicide victims were children. 
Flonda Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Flonda Mortality Review Project 1997, p. 45, 
table 11 
• when children are killed during a domestic dispute, 90% are under age 10; 56% are 
under age 2. 
Flonda Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Flonda Mortality Review Project 1997, p.51, 
table 28 
DATING VIOLENCE 
Violence against intimates may occur even though the victim does 
not live with her abuser. 
• violence against women occurs in 20% of dating couples. 
American Psychi Ass'n, Violence and the Family Report of the Amencan Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p. 10. 
• an average of 28% of high school and college students experience dating violence 
at some point. 
Brustin, S . Legal Response to Teen Dating Violence, Family Law Quarterly, vol 29, no 2. 331 (Summer 1995) 
(citing Levy, In Love & in Danger a teen's guide to breaking free of an abusive relationship, 1993). 
• 26% of pregnant teens reported being physically abused by their boyfriends, about 
half of them said the battering began or intensified after he learned of her 
pregnancy. 
Brustin, S . Legal Response to Teen Dating Violence, Family Law Quarterly, vol 29, no 2. 333-334 (Summer 
1995) (citing Worcester. A More Hidden Crime: Adolescent Battered Women, The Network News, July/Aug., 
national Women's Health Network 1993). 
• victims of dating violence report the abuse takes many forms: insults, humiliation, 
monitoring the victim's movements, isolation of the victim from family and friends, 
suicide threats, threats to harm family or property, and physical or sexual abuse, 
their abusers also blamed them for the abuse, or used jealousy as an excuse. 
Brustin. S , Legal Response to Teen Dating Violence. Family Law Quarterly, vol 29. no 2. 336 (Summer 1995) 
(citing Gamache, Domination and Control: The Social Context of Dating Violence, in Dating Violence. Young 
Women in Danger, Levy, ed. 1991). 
• 25 - 33% of adolescent abusers reported that their violence served to "intimidate,'' 
frighten," or "force the other person to give me something." 
Brustin. S , Legal Response to Teen Dating Violence. Family Law Quarterly, vol 29. no 2, 335 (Summer 1995). 
SELF-DEFENSE 
Many battered women attempt to physically defend themselves 
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from abuse. 
• marital homicide differs significantly by gender a large proportion of the killings by 
women are acts of self-defense, while almost none of the killings by men are acts of 
self-defense. 
Florida Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence Flonda Mortality Review Project Executive 
Summary 1997 
• defensive action by battered women to protect themselves or their children is often 
interpreted by law enforcement as an act of domestic violence the number of 
battered women arrested for committing acts of violence against their partners has 
disproportionately increased in communities that overuse "dual arrest" 
Promising Practices Initiatives Report on the Expert Panels on Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking 
Technical Assistance Project, U S Department of Justice, 1997 
PHYSICAL INJURY AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Victims of domestic violence often require medical care, although 
they may conceal the cause of their injuries. 
• female victims of violence are 2 5 times more likely to be injured when the violence 
is committed by an intimate than when committed by a stranger. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Violence Against Women Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348), August 1995, p 4 
• because domestic abuse is an ongoing cycle producing increasingly severe injuries 
over time, battered women are likely to see physicians frequently 
Children's Safety Network, Domestic Violence A Directory of Protocols for Health Care Providers (1992) p (I) 
• the rate of domestic violence detection by emergency room doctors is low 
Abbott et a l , Domestic Violence Against Women Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Department 
Population, Journal of the American Medical Association, vol 273, no 22,1763,1766 (June 1995) 
• although battered women comprise 20 - 30% of ambulatory care patients, only 1 in 
20 is correctly identified as such by medical practitioners. 
Hyman et a l , Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence Do They Promote Patient Well-Being?, Journal 
of the American Medical Association, vol 273. no 22,1781 (June 1995) 
• one study found that less than 3% of women visiting emergency rooms disclosed or 
were asked about domestic violence by a nurse or physician 
Abbott et al Domestic Violence Against Women Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Department 
Population. Journal of the American Medical Association, vol 273 no 22.1763,1765 (June 1995) 
• the use of emergency room protocols for identifying and treating victims of domestic 
violence has been found to increase the identification of victims by medical 
practitioners from 5 6% to 30%. 
Children's Safety NeftKXk, Domestic Violence A Directory of Protocols for Health Care Providers (1992) p (I) 
• 17% of those who visit emergency rooms for treatment are documented as having 
come as a result of being injured by an intimate 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Violence-Related Injunes Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments (NCJ-
156921) August 1997 p 5 
• 37% of women injured by violence and treated in an emergency room were injured 
by an intimate, less than 5% of men injured by violence and treated in an emergency 
room were injured by an intimate 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Violence-Related Injunes Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments (NCJ-
156921) August 1997 p 5 
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• 243,000 people receiving emergency room treatment for violence-related injuries in 
1994 had been injured by an intimate, female victims outnumbered males 9 to 1. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Violence-Related Injuries Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments (NCJ-
156921), August 1997 p 5. 
• "acute domestic violence" was the reason for 1 out of 9 patients emergency room 
visit among women with a current partner. 
Abbott et a l , Domestic Violence Against Women Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Department 
Population, Journal of the Amencan Medical Association, vol 273, no 22, 1763, 1765 (June 1995). 
• one study of women visiting emergency rooms for treatment found that 54% had 
been threatened or injured by an intimate partner at some time in their lives, and 
24% reported having been injured by their current partner in the past. 
Abbott et al., Domestic Violence Against Women: Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Department 
Population, Journal of the Amencan Medical Association, vol. 273, no 22.1763,1765 (June 1995). 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Intervention of the police and the court system can be improved in 
domestic violence cases. 
• every state allows its police to arrest perpetrators of misdemeanor domestic violence 
incidents upon probable cause, and more than half of the states and the district of 
Columbia havelaws requiring police to arrest on probable cause for at least some 
domestic violence crimes. 
Zorza. Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why it may prove the best first step in curbing repeat abuse, 
Criminal Justice, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 66 (FaH 1995). 
• only about one-seventh of all domestic assaults come to the attention of the police. 
Florida Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Florida Mortality Review Project 1997, p. 3. 
• female victims of domestic violence are 6 times less likely to report crime to law 
enforcement as female victims of stranger violence. 
Amencan Psycnl. Ass'n, Violence and the Family: Report of the American Psychological Association 
Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family (1996), p 10. 
• when an injury was inflicted upon a woman by her intimate partner, she reported the 
violence to the police only 55% of the time, she was even less likely to report 
violence when she did not sustain injury. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348). August 1996, p. 5. 
• some studies indicate that arresting a batterer increases recidivism, while some 
studies indicate that arrest serves as a deterrent for future domestic violence. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed.. Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p. 46 (1996). 
• arresting a batterer may reduce violence in the short term, but may increase 
violence in the long term. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed., Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work'' p 43,49 (1996). 
• the varying effect of arrest on abusers may be related to the amount the batterer has 
to lose from facing the social consequences of arrest, the single most consistent 
result of studies of the effect of arrest on batterers is that unemployed suspects 
become more violent after an arrest, and employed suspects do not. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed . Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? pp 48-49 (1996). 
• even if arrest may not deter unemployed abusers, arrest still deters the vast majority 
of abusers. 
Zorza. The Cnminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990 The Journal of Cnminal Law & 
Criminology (Northwestern School of Law), vol 83, no 1, p 66 (1992) 
• possession of a gun by anyone subject to a protection order is prohibited by federal 
law. 
The Violent Cnme Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,18 U S C 922(g)(8) 
• purchase or ownership of a gun by anyone convicted of a misdemeanor domestic 
violence offense is prohibited by federal law. 
Domestic Violence Offenders Gun Ban (1996), 18 U S C 922(g)(9) 
PROTECTION ORDERS 
Protection orders decrease, but do not eliminate, the risk of 
continuing abuse or homicide. 
• a protection order issued by one U.S. state or indian tribe is valid and enforceable in 
any other U.S. state or Indian tribe. 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994,18 U S C 2265. 
• in cases of marital or dating violence, which accounted for 82% of all protection 
order cases, 90% of defendants were male. 
Adams & Powell, Tragedies of Domestic Violence A qualitative analysis of civti restraining orders m 
Massachusetts, Office of the Commissioner of Probation, Massachusetts Trial Court, p. 9 (1995). 
• 35% of women with temporary protection orders did not return for a protection order 
because respondent stopped battering her; 17% because service of process was not 
achieved. 
CPOs* the Benefits and Limitations for Victims of Domestic Violence. National Center for State Courts Research 
Report 1997 
'• more than 17% of domestic homicide victims had a protection order against the 
perpetrator at the time of the killing. 
Florida Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Florida Mortality Review Protect, 1997, p 46, 
table 15. 
• although the majority of batterers do not have criminal records, the majority of 
batterers brought to court by their victims for a protection order had criminal records. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed . Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 10 (1996). 
• protection order defendants who had prior criminal histories were more likely to 
violate the order than those who did not. 
Adams & Powell, Tragedies of Domestic Violence: A Qualitative Analysts of Ctvtl Restraining Orders in 
Massachusetts. Office of the Commissioner of Probation, Massachusetts Trial Court, p. 17 (1995). 
• in one study, nearly half of the victims who obtained a protection order were re-
abused within two years. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed.. Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p. 10 (1996). 
• the majority of women who seek temporary protection orders have complaints of 
serious abuse: physical assaults, threats to kill or harm her, or attempts or threats to 
take the children. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed., Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 216 (1996). 
• in one study of women seeking temporary protection orders, 56% has sustained 
physical injuries. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 216 (1996). 
e 60% of women in one study reported acts of abuse after the entry of a protection 
order, and 30% reported acts of severe violence. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 223 (1996). 
e entry of a protection order did not appear to deter most types of abuse, but it did 
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significantly reduce the likelihood of acts of psychological abuse such as preventing 
the victim from leaving her home, going to work, using a car or telephone, and 
stalking and harassing behaviors. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 228-229 (1996) 
• one study showed 80% of women with temporary protection order said the order 
was somewhat or very helpful in sending the batterer a message that his actions 
were wrong, less than 50% of the women thought that the batterer believed he had 
to obey the order 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 218 (1996) 
• most violations of protection orders leading to an arrest occurred within 90 days of 
the entry of the order. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 200 (1996) 
• 60% of those obtaining protection orders in one study reported violations within one 
year. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 240 (1996). 
• calls to police due to violations of protection orders were high, but the arrests were 
rare. 
Buzawa & Buzawa ed , Do Arrests and Restraining Orders Work? p 239 (1996). 
• 17% of protection orders defendants in a 1995 study were arraigned for a violation of 
the order within one year. 
Adams & Powell, Tragedies of Domestic Violence A Qualitative Analysts of Civil Restraining Orders in 
Massachusetts, Office of the Commissioner of Probation. Massachusetts Tnal Court, p. 15 (1995).< 
• 6% of protection order defendants were convicted of violating the order. 
Adams & Powell. Tragedies of Domestic Violence' A Qualitative Analysis of Gvtl Restraining Orders in 
Massachusetts, Office of the Commissioner of Probation Massachusetts Tnal Court, p. 17 (1995). 
STALKING 
Batterers may attempt to frighten or control their victims through 
stalking. 
• some advocates believe up to 80% of stalking cases occur within intimate 
relationships. 
Domestic Violence. Stalking and Anti-StaHdng Legislation, an Annual Report to Congress under the Violence 
Against Women Act, National institute of Justice Research, April 1996, p 3 
• if stalking occurs within an intimate relationship, it typically begins after the woman 
attempts to leave the relationship. 
Domestic Violence, Stalking and Anti-Stalking Legislation, an Annual Report to Congress under the Violence 
Against Women Act National Institute of Justice Research, Apnl 1996, p 1 
SEPARATION VIOLENCE 
When a woman leaves her batterer, her risk of serious violence or 
death increases dramatically. 
• separated/divorced women are 14 times more likely than married women to report 
having been a victim of violence by their spouse or ex-spouse. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Female Victims of Violent Crime 1991 
• women separated from their husbands were 3 times more likely to be victimized by 
spouses than divorced women, and 25 times more likely to be victimized by spouses 
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than married women. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Violence Against Women: Estimates from the Redesigned Survey 
(NCJ-154348), August 1995, p. 4. 
• 65% of intimate homicide victims physically separated from the perpetrator prior to 
their death. 
Florida Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence. Florida Mortality Review Project, 1997, p.47, 
table 17. 
HOMICIDE 
Domestic hoi ilicide is often the culmination of an escalating history 
of abuse. 
• female homicide victims are more than twice as likely to have been killed by an 
intimate partner than are male homicide victims. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: Female Victims of Violent Crime, December, 1996. 
• 88% of victims dor i lestic violence fatalities had a documented history of physical 
abuse. 
Florida Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Florida Mortality Review Project 1997, pp.46-
48, tables 14-21. 
• 44% of victims of intimate homicides had prior threats by the killer to kill victim or 
self. 30% had prior police calls to the residence. 17% had a protection order. 
Florida Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Florida Mortality Review Project 1997, pp.46* 
46, tables 14-21 
• for homicides in which the victim-kWer relationship was known, 31% of female 
victims were killed by an intimate. 4% of male victims were killed by an intimate. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report Sex Differences in Violent Victimization, 1994 (NCJ-164508), 
September, 1997, p. 1. 
• 70% of intimate-partner homicide victims are women. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Selected Findings: Violence Between Intimates (NCJ-149259) November, 1994. 
• a woman is the perpetrator in 19% of domestic homicides. 
Florida Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Florida Mortality Review Project 1997, p.44, 
table 7. 
• when a woman is the perpetrator of a domestic homicide, typically the abuser was 
killed during an assaultive incident in which the woman was the victim. 
Browne When Battered Women KM, pp. 135-137 (1987) 
• in a 1967 study, 60% of husbands who were Killed by their wives precipitated 
own deaths by being the first to use physical force or threaten with a weapon 
Browne. When Battered Women KM, p. 10 (1987). 
• homicides committed by victims during a battering incident were often committed 
with the abuser's own weapon. 
Browne, When Battered Women K», p. 140 (1987). 
e a 1978 study found that almost all of the wives who had killed their husbands IWJI.1 
previously been beaten by their husbands. 
Browne, When Battered Women Kill, p. 10 (1987). 
• of women killed in 1992, their relationship to the killer was known in 69% of 
homicides, of this percent, 28% were killed by spouse, ex-spouse, boyfriend or ex-
boyfriend. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics: National <', \wm " ictirraiatiori Survev 1995,, 
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• of men killed in 1992, their relationship to the killer was known in 59% of homicides, 
of this percent, 3% were killed by spouse, ex-spouse, girlfriend or ex-girlfriend. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics National Cnme Victimization Survey, 1995 
MULTIPLE-VICTIM HOMICIDE 
In some domestic homicides, the perpetrator kills more than one 
person. 
• in 1994, 38% of domestic homicides were multiple-victim, usually combining a 
spouse homicide and suicide, or child homicide. 
Flonda Governor* s Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence, Flonda Mortality Review Project, 1997. p.45, 
table 12. 
• where there are multiple victims in a domestic homicide, 89% of perpetrators are 
male. 
Flonda Governor's Task Force on Domestic and Sexual Violence. Florida Mortality Review Project 1997, p.52, 
table 29. 
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